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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:
Case No. 14H8

-vs-

:

RONALD JOE MINNISH,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, appeals from
/*

a conviction of murder in the second degree in the Third
#Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, was convicted
by a jury verdict of murder in the second degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1975), on
May 14, 1975. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the
Utah St^te Prison on May 21, 1975, for a term of five years
to life.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered by the
jury at the trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts
related in appellant's brief with the following additions
and corrections:
1.

Evidence was introduced indicating that the

appellant had been carrying a gun on him a few hours
before the fatal shooting, and that the owner of the
Indigo Lounge had told him tQ take it outside (T.I-13,
14,22).

Testimony also indicated that the appellant

apparently told the deceased that he "packed" a gun
and that he knew that the deceased did not have a gun
on him (Tr.II-r23,24 ,38).
2.

Appellant and deceased appeared to be more

or less friendly most of the evening (T.1-15;11-21)
although the evidence introduced indicated that during
the evening both individuals may have spoken in loud
voices (Tr.1-22,27).

The appellant testified that

they were not arguing, but merely discussing professional
boxing and other topics (Tr.II-107) . Evidence was

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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admitted showing that right before, the fight, the
deceased tried to shake hands with the appellant
(Tr.I~57).
3.

Brent Barnes, a patron of the Indigo

Lounge, testified that at one point the appellant
got up and started to go outside and then the deceased
got up and followed him out.

Barnes testified he

followed them out because he understood they were
going to fight (Tr.1-28,41,42).

"The talk was

actually that Minnish was giving Gomer (deceased)
a hard time because he stuttered."
4*

(Tr.I-42).

The evidence that was introduced showed that

the appellant did not get up to leave the bar with the
intention of going home.

The bartender of the Indigo

Lounge testified that "He got up and he said, f I will
be right back.'" (Tr.11-23). Also:
"Q. [Was it] apparent to you
that Mr. Minnish was not [returning]?
A. No. He left his change on
the bar and his drink and he said he would
be right back.
Q. I thought you said he was
going?
A. No. I said he said, 'I'll
be right back.' He took a sip out
of his drink and sat it down and said
•I'll be right back.'" (Tr.11-39).
5.

When the deceased returned to the bar after

the fight, he indicated his concern about possibly having
hurt appellant (Tr.I-31;II-26).

He also said to Crofford

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Stevens, a patron referring to the fight:
"Come here. I want to show
you what I done. I want you to
come outside with me. I want
you to see what I've done. I
didn't want to do it." (Tr.I-58).
6.

Fred Manning and the deceased went back out-

side to check on appellant's condition.

Evidence indicated

that while outside, the deceased tried to apologize to
appellant, saying:
IT69).

"I always wanted to be friends." (Tr.

"Please, I want to be your friend; I didn't mean

to do what I did." (Tr.1-69-70).

See also Tr.I-74;II-26,27 .

Shortly thereafter, Manning and deceased returned to the bar
(Tr.I-33).
7.

The appellant pulled his revolver out of his

International Travel-All (Tr.I-71).
8.

The appellant returned to the bar and walked

up to the deceased.

He pulled his revolver out of his

pocket and aimed at the deceased (Tr.1-34,44;II-27).
9.

Upon seeing the gun the deceased backed up

several feet, then grabbed a bar stool and tossed it at
the appellant (Tr.1-35,47,60;II-27-29).
10.

Fred Manning grabbed for appellant's arm but

was shaken off.

Moments later appellant fired the shot

which killed the deceased (Tr.1-35,49,60,61;II-29).
11.

Appellant went toward the door, was told to

stop by one of the patrons; then he pointed the gun toward
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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those inside, and then left (Tr.I-38,39,51,61)•
12.

The Deputy Sheriff testified that he received

a dispatch to observe an International Travel-All in his
area (Tr.11-1,2).

He testified that the road conditions

were ice-packed and very slick (Tr.II-2).

The evidence

indicated that when the deputy stopped the appellant, the
appellant was having some difficulty maneuvering but
that that was not unusual because of the weather conditions
(Tr.II-5).
13.

The deputy observed the murder weapon

partially visible from underneath the appellant's vehicle
(Tr.II-6).
14•

As a result of his gunshot wound, the deceased

died December 14, 1974. The appellant was tried by a jury
and convicted of murder in the second degree.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR ALTERCATION INVOLVING THE
VICTIM.
The rules of evidence concerning the character of
the deceased in a homicide case vary depending on the facts
involved, whether the evidence of character is shown by

-5-
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specific instances, general reputation or past convictions,
and in some jurisdictions whether the accused knew of the
victim's alleged reputation.

The Utah Rules of Evidence,

effective July 1, 1971, provide that whether or not a
trial judge should exclude admissible evidence is within
the court's discretion:

Rule 45 states:

"Except as in these rules
otherwise provided, the judge may
in his discretion exclude evidence
if he finds that its probative
value is substantially outweighed
by the risk that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate
that such evidence would be offered."
The trial record reveals that the court rejected appellant's
proffer of evidence because he felt the deceased's character
was not an ultimate issue (Tr.11-93,94), thereby not
bringing the question under Rule 46, infra.
Respondent claims that the trial court was correct,
that the deceased's character was not an ultimate issue in
the trial because appellant never established its probative
value.

However, even if the deceased's character were

relevant under Rule 46, respondent contends the evidence
appellant wanted to submit was still properly excluded.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rule 46 states:
"When a person's character or
a trait of his character is in issue,
it may be proved by testimony in the
form of opinion, evidence of reputation,
or evidence of specific instances of
the person's conduct, subject, however,
to the limitations of Rules 47 and 48."
Rule 47 states:
"Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of
a person's character is relevant as
tending to prove his conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may be proved
in the same manner as provided by Rule
46, except that (a) evidence of specific
instances of conduct other than evidence
of conviction of a crime which tends to
prove the trait to be bad shall be
inadmissible. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
In the trial, appellant sought to admit evidence pertaining
to a specific incident of deceased's conduct which was not
evidence of a conviction.
"Mr. Van Sciver: Let me make
a proffer with respect to that which I
think is appropriate under the rule, as
I understand it.
I am now going to back off from
the suggestion I will prove two incidents
which are unfortunate, but I have had a
witness who has decided maybe after all
it wasn't Mr. Pearson. And I have a
problem with that in my own mind because
it is so far removed, it is about
eight years old. The incident I do want
to be introduced and which I will now
talk about involves a gentle man by the
name of Tom A. Osborne. . . ." (Tr.11-86).
In People v. Soules, 41 C.A.2d 298, 106 P.2d 639
(1940), the Third District Court of Appeals of California
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

upheld the second degree murder conviction of a defendant
who claimed that the trial court erred by refusing to admit
evidence showing that the victim had committed former
acts of violence against other persons.
"It is true that, in some
jurisdictions, under proper circumstances, evidence of prior specific
acts of violence by the defendant
upon other individuals may be
shown in a subsequent trial for
murder where the accused admits the
homicide and first establishes a
prima facie case of necessary selfdefense. Evidence of prior acts J
of violence by the defendant upon
other persons, of which the accused
has previous knowledge, is sometimes
admitted, after proof that the
defendant had knowledge that the
deceased previously threatened him,
on the theory that such evidence,
in view of the former threats, would
reflect some light on the question of
whether the defendant killed his
antagonist in the honest belief that
he was about to receive great bodily
harm at his hands. It is asserted, in
support of the competency of such evidence
of prior acts of violence against other
persons, that knowledge of the fact
that a person who had previously
threatened the defendant, was a violent,
turbulent and dangerous man, would furnish
some cause for a man to reasonably assume
that he was about to receive great bodily
harm from him, and therefore justify
killing him, provided the surrounding
circumstances otherwise warranted
that conclusion. In other words, it is
argued that knowledge of the fact that
an antagonist is a bad and dangerous
man may reasonably increase one's fear
of him.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It is, however, apparent that
even if such evidence is competent,
under certain circumstances, it
should be received with caution for
the reason that it is remote,
weak, collateral to the real issue,
confusing to the jury, unsatisfactory
and difficult to rebut. To entitle
such evidence to any substantial
weight it would be necessary to adduce
proof of the circumstances of each
previous affray to fairly determine
whether the deceased was warranted in
acting as he did. For those reasons
the great weight of authority holds
that evidence of such prior specific
acts of violence by the deceased upon
other persons is not admissible
upon trial of a subsequent offense.
It is almost uniformly held that proof
of the turbulent, violent and
dangerous character of a person,
offered for the purpose of concluding
therefrom that he was more likely to
have been the aggressor in an affray
which resulted in his death, must be
established by evidence of his general
reputation for peace and quiet in the
community where he resides." Id. at
642. (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Mason, 208 Kan. 39, 490 P.2d 418 (19
Generally, for evidence pertaining to the
character of the victim to be admitted, the defendant
must show that he acted in self-defense.

40 C.J.S.

Homicide § 272(c) explains under what circumstances a
defendant may not claim self-defense:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Evidence of the dangerous
and violent character of deceased
is not admissible where• at the
time such evidence is offered, it
appears from the evidence already
introduced that accused provoked
the difficulty, or was the assailant,
where he was in no danger of loss of
life or serious bodily harm, or did not
believe himself to be in such danger, or
there was nothing to excite the fears of
a reasonable man that such danger existed;
where he did not retreat while he might
safety have done so; where deceased was
retreating or running away from accused
at the time of the killing, or had
declined further to combat before the
fatal shot was fired; or where it is
claimed that the killing was
accidental, or accused denies that he
killed deceased."
See also McCaghren v. State, 294 So.2d 756 (Ala. Ct. of
Appeals, 1973); reversed on other grounds, 292 Ala. 378,
294 So.2d 766 (1973).

In State v. Sherrill, 496 S.W.2d

321 (Mo. App. 1973) , the Court affirmed the second degree
murder conviction where the defendant, rather than remain
in the tavern or retreat when his codefendants pursued
the victim outside the bar, himself actively pursued the
deceased resulting in a struggle fatal to the victim.
Court discussed the circumstances in which a defendant
may claim self-defense:

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

"Additional reasons negate this
defense by defendant. The right to kill
in self-defense rests in real or
apparently real, necessity . . . One
who was the aggressor or who provoked
the difficulty in which he killed another
cannot invoke the right of self-defense
to excuse or justify the homicide, unless
he had previously, in good faith, withdrew
from the combat in such a manner as to
have shown in his intention in good faith
to desist. . .
Self-defense is a last resort and in
order to justify a homicide on such grounds
the doer of the homicidal act must have
done everything in his power, consistent
with his own safety, to avoid the danger
and avert the necessity, and he must retreat,
if retreat be practicable." Id. at 325, 326.
The Utah Supreme Court has just recently addressed
itself to the question of self-defense.

In State v. Schoenfeld,

545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976), this Court upheld the conviction of
negligent homicide where the defendant claimed self-defense,
stating:
" . . . Under our law a person is
legally justified in using force which
is intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if he
reasonably believes that the force used
is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or to a third
person.
However, a person is not justified
in using force under the circumstances set
forth in the preceding paragraph if he
either:
(a) Initially provokes the use of
force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily
harm upon the assailant; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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.

(b) Is attempting to commit, is
committing, or is fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of
a felony and, under the law, it is a
felony if one uses a deadly weapon in
threatening to do bodily injury to
another and accompanies that threat by
a show of immediate force of violence; or
*

*

*

An agressor is one who willingly and
knowingly initially provokes a combat or
does acts of such a nature as would
ordinarily lead to combat. A person can
also be classified as an aggressor if
he leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms
himself, and then returns to the scene
and renews the quarrel." Id. at 196.
Respondent contends that the trial court properly
excluded the evidence pertaining to the victim because the
appellant was never in a position to claim self-defense.
In the case at bar the evidence did not prove that the
victim was the aggressor of their original fight outside
the Indigo Lounge and in fact there was evidence to the
contrary, namely, that appellant was belittling the victim
because he stuttered (Tr.I-42).

Further, the victim went

back outside to see if he had hurt the appellant (Tr.I-31),
a witness testifying that "he meant to be friendly, again,
apparently it sounded like he wanted to apologize."
(Tr.1-68-70).

Then appellant followed the victim back

inside after first getting his gun.

Appellant did not

retreat, assuming he ever did in fact fear the victim, but

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rather he armed himself and followed the deceased back
into the bar. Again, once inside the bar, there was no
evidence of provocation by the deceased, yet appellant
walked in, pulled his gun out, aimed, and moments later
fired the fatal shot (Tr.I~60, 61) .
Appellant relies on State v. Griffin, 99 Ariz*
43, 406 P.2d 397 (1965), to support his contention that
the evidence should have been admitted.

It is true that the

Court in Griffin did say it was error for the trial court to
refuse to admit evidence of the victim's reputation of
argumentativeness, belligerence, and quarrelsomeness; but in
Griffin, there was a strong showing that the defendant acted
in self-defense.

Even more important, the appellate court found

there were several other errors, and the court reversed,
without stating specific grounds and apparently reversing
because of the accumulation of errors.

The Court in Griffin

never said that the trial court's refusal to admit the
evidence of character was a reversible error.
Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354 (1960), cited
by appellant, is also distinguished on the basis of a clear
showing of self-defense on the part of the defendant.

In

Evans, the defendant, a woman, was walking at 5:00 a.m. in
Washington, D.C., when deceased walked up to her and asked
whether she was "out for some sporting."

When she rebuffed
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him, deceased attacked her, ripping off some of her
clothes.

She admitted stabbing him with a knife she

claimed she had for self-defense.

Missing from Evans was

evidence that the defendant was the aggressor or in any other
way not eligible for the claim of self-defense.

It should

be noted that in both Griffin and Evans, there were problems
concerning the witnesses.

In Griffin, the only witnesses

were the defendants ex-wife and a friend of the victim.
In JSvans, there was evidence of other witnesses but the
incident occurred at 5:00 a.m., making eye-witness more
difficult.

In the instant case, there were several detached

witnesses to the events of the evening the appellant shot
the victim.

This distinction is important because the

decision whether or not to admit evidence pertaining to the
victim is based on the inquiry, "What did the deceased do?"
The answer to this inquiry is better obtained by the direct
evidence of eye witnesses than by conjecture as to what
might have happened considering the defendant and victim
involved.

In Utah, if a judge thinks that evidence may

"create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury," then by
virtue of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, supra,
he may exclude it.
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This point is discussed in the case cited by
appellant, State v. Maresf 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861
(1948).

In Mares, the defendant was convicted of first

degree murder.

At his trial, defendant introduced evidence

that he and the deceased were intoxicated, that the deceased
was the aggressor, and that he killed in self-defense.

The

Utah Supreme Court held that the state could admit rebuttal
testimony concerning the deceased's temperate habits,
stating, "The real question to be determined is what did
the deceased probably do?"

][d. at 866.

The Court noted

that there were no witnesses to this killing; the verdict
turned solely on whether the jury believed the defendant's
story or the state's version.

Respondent submits that

generally where there are no witnesses and the conduct of
the deceased is unknown, then it would be proper for a trial
court to admit evidence as to deceased's character in a case
where the defendant claims self-defense.

Respondent contends,

however, that such is not the case at bar.

The shooting of

Pearson was witnessed by several objective witnesses.

The

transcript is replete with testimony that the deceased was not
an aggressor when appellant approached with his gun and shot
him.

There is no question concerning the deceased's conduct

in this case and therefore the trial court was free to exclude
the evidence of character.

Respondent submits that there

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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where the conduct of the deceased is known or unclear,
then it is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to admit or exclude evidence concerning his
character.
In

Cole v. State, 193 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1966),

also cited by appellant, the Florida Supreme Court
cites one of its earlier opinions, Garner v. State,
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891):
"Evidence of the violent and
dangerous character of the deceased
is admissible to show, or as tending
to show, that a defendant has acted in
self-defense, or, in other words, under
such circumstances as would have
naturally caused a man of ordinary
reason to believe that he was at the time
of killing in imminent danger of losing
his life or suffering great bodily harm
at the hands of the deceased; but it
is not admissible for this purpose
except where it explains, or will
give meaning, significance, or point
to the conduct of the deceased at the
time of the killing, or will tend to
do so; and such conduct of the deceased,
at the time of the killing, which it is
proposed thus to explain, must be shown
before the auxiliary evidence of such
character can be introduced." Cole v.
State, 193 So.2d at 48.
It is important to note that there were no witnesses to
the actual killing in Cole, but there was direct evidence
that the deceased was the aggressor and that the defendant
may well have acted in self-defense.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
-1contain
£~ errors.

The facts of the instant case do not bring
it under the authority cited by the appellant.

The

trial court acted properly within its discretion in
excluding the evidence of a prior altercation involving
the victim.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE
CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER WERE PROPER AND IN
ACCORD WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (SUPP. 1975).
The trial court instructed the jury that the
appellant was charged with criminal homicide, second
degree murder, as per the information (Record, 46).
The Court defined the culpable mental states (intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal
negligence) in Instruction No. 11:
"Considering these factors,
our law states that a person engages
in conduct: * * * 3. 'Recklessly1
when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that under
the existing circumstances the
result will occur." (Record, Al.)
The Instruction is in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(3) (1953), as amended:
"(3) Recklessly, or maliciously,
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he is aware of but
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consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint."
What the appellant is arguing is that some of
the language in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (c) which now
defines murder in the second degree has previously been
interpreted by this Court to encompass a fact situation
unlike the one in the instant case; specifically, that
the evidence did not disclose that the appellant created
a grave risk of death to any person other than the victim
or that the appellant acted with depraved indifference
to human life.

Appellant cites State v. Russell/ 106

Utah 116/ 145 P.2d 1003 (1944), which states that this
language requires that the actor's act must be one dangerous
to other persons as well as the victim and not directed
at any one person in particular.

Respondent does not

disagree with appellant's reading of Russell/ but claims
that nonetheless there is no merit to appellant's
argument.
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Utah's new Criminal Code, effective July 1,
1973, abrogated the old code (with exceptions provided
for by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (Supp. 1975)); and
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (Supp. 1975),
the new code abolished common law crimes.

Some

offenses which would have been first degree murder under
the old code now under the new code constitute second
degree murder.

Under the old code, second degree

murder was "any other homicide committed under such

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (Supp. 1975), states:
"(1) The provisions of this
code shall govern the construction of,
the punishment for, and defenses against
any offense defined in this code or,
except where otherwise specifically
provided or the context otherwise
requires, any offense defined outside
this code; provided such offense was
committed after the effective date of
this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior
to the effective date of this code shall
be governed by the law, statutory and
non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense
or limitation on punishment available
under this code shall be available to
any defendant tried or retried after the
effective date. An offense under the
laws of this state shall be deemed to
have been committed prior to the effective
date of this act if any of the elements of
the offense occurred prior thereto."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (Supp. 1975), states: "Common
law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless
made so by this code, other applicable statute or
ordinance."
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circumstances as would have constituted murder at common
law" but not amounting to first degree murder.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953), as amended (now repealed).
Under the new code, to be convicted of second degree
murder, the evidence must prove that the homicide was
committed under one of the circumstances under subparagraph (a) through (d) of Section 76-5-203.

The new

code eliminates the uncertainty as to the definition
of murder in the second degree because of its former
relationship to the common law.
The cases relied upon by the appellant were
decided under the authority of the old code; those
decisions cannot now be maintained as authority for
statutory interpretation under the new code, especially
when, as in this case, the language is not even the same.'

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953), as amended, now
repealed, definition of first degree murder included:
". . . perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to
the lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life. . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (in effect) definition of
second degree murder includes: "Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, he recklessly engaged in conduct which causes
a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes
the death of another. . . ."
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Whether the appellant's conduct falls within the
definition of Section 76-5-203 (c) is a question of fact for
the jury.

The transcript reveals that the trial court took

appellantfs motion to strike Section 76-5-203(c) from the
Information under advisement (Tr.11-85).

The advantage

in doing so was for the court to hear the evidence presented
at trial to see if the instruction was supported by a reasonable interpretation of evidence.

The trial court ruled that

it did, and properly left the question to the triers of
fact.
Last, even assuming that the appellant's argument
is valid, the evidence was clear that the appellant did
endanger the lives of the others in the bar and that his
act was not directed at any one person.

The appellant

came into the bar after the deceased with a gun, knowing
it to be loaded (Tr.III-116), and admittedly under the
influence of alcohol.

He shot the deceased and proceeded

to point his gun at those people inside the bar.

The

appellant himself testifed that the trigger of his gun
was fixed so that it could go off very easily.

He

testified that the fingerguard and the hammer had been
removed.

-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q.

Wouldn't it be true, it would give

you more ready access to the firing of the gun?
You wouldn't have to stick your finger in it?
" A. •' I would think that would be a safety
hazard myself, not having the guard around the
trigger.
By appellant's own admission, his gun
was even more dangerous than an ordinary gun.

In

light of the evidence introduced that the appellant
was under the influence of intoxicants, that his
gun was easily discharged, and that he pointed it
directly at the people in the bar, after having
just shot one of them, it is clear the evidence
supported a reasonable interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-503 (c).

-22-
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POINT III
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE
MURDER.
This court, in accord with long established
precedent, has held it will not review the sufficiency
of evidence as to the rectitude of an appellant's
conviction, unless there is a clear showing that the
evidence could not support the conviction.

See

State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909 (1930); Wyatt
v. Baughman, 121 Utah 2d 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951).

In

short, there is a strong presumption attached to the
validity of the trial court judgment and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in support of such
judgment until and unless the complaining party can
demonstrate the error of such judgment.

Burton v. Zions

Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249
P.2d 514 (1952).

In the instant case there is no

affirmative showing that conviction was obtained without sufficiency of evidence.
Additionally, in order to get its case before
the jury, the state need only present evidence of each
element of the crime charged.

As stated in the case

of Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252
P.2d 205 (1953):
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"In order to establish a
prima facie case plaintiff must
present some evidence of every
element needed to make out a cause
of action.11 Id. at 207.
The evidence introduced by the state which
makes out the prima facie case is as follows:
1.

Following a fight with the deceased the

appellant took his gun from his automobile, pursued the
deceased, and shot him knowing him to be unarmed.
There were eye-witnesses to this entire incident.
2.

Appellant did so, having some knowledge of guns

CT. Ill-lie); ] and within a range of a few feet from
the victim.
3.

Although there was evidence that the

appellant had had much to drink during that day and
evening, it was a question of fact whether he was
capable of forming the requisite mens rea for the
crime.

The
4.

jury found that he did.
The appellant pointed the gun at the other

people in the bar as he was leaving.

He did so, knowing

the gun was loaded (Tr. III-116) and knowing that the
trigger could go off easily because the fingerguard had
been removed from it (Tr.III-116).
5.

The man the appellant shot died from the

wound he received.
Such evidence was sufficient to at least take the
case to the jury for determination.

Once the case went
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to the jury, there was clearly sufficient evidence
for reasonable minds acting on it to have found the
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

jury can find not only facts directly proved by the
evidence, but any additional facts which are reasonable inferences of the facts proved.

State v. Kazda,

15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
Thus, it is clear that the jury could, from
the evidence and reasonable inferences, have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the appellant to prevail on an assertion
of insufficiency of evidence:
" . . . it must appear that,
viewing the evidence and all
fair inferences reasonably to
be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the juryfs
verdict, reasonable minds could
not believe them guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, but would
necessarily entertain some substantial doubt of their guilt."
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110,
307 P.2d 212 (1957).
Also, it is settled that a jury verdict will not be
reversed merely because reasonable minds may have had a
reasonable doubt or that conflicting inferences might
have been drawn from the evidence.

A recent expression

by this court on the matter is contained in State v.
Sullivan, supra:
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"But it is not sufficient merely
that reasonable minds may have entertained such doubt. Before a verdict
may properly be set aside, it must
appeal that the evidence was so
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds acting fairly upon
it must ha:ve entertained reasonable
doubt that defendants committed the
crime." 302 P.2d at 212 (Emphasis
added).
In State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d
584 (1937), this court stated:
"The fact that there was some
contradictory evidence or that
conflicting inferences might
reasonably be deduced from the
evidence does not warrant us
in disturbing the verdict of the
jury." Id. at 568 (Emphasis added).
Thus, the verdict of the jury is given great weight,
and will only be reversed if it is shown

that there

is no evidence upon which it could reasonably be based.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the trial court committed
no error in this case prejudicial to the rights of the
appellant in the admission of evidence, the instructions,
or in any of the other rulings made in the trial of
this case.

Respondent submits that there is substantial
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evidence in the record to sustain the jury's verdict
of second degree murder.

Respondent further submits

that this court should not disturb those findings of
fact and should affirm the conviction of the appellant
as adjudged in the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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